Table of Contents

Over half of the University's unauthorized releases of personal information could have been avoided if lost or stolen laptops' hard drives had been encrypted. While operating systems provide access control mechanisms that can prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data, a data thief with physical access to a computer can bypass these protections, either by moving the storage to another computer or simply by starting the operating system in a manner that grants access to the thief. Encrypting data "at rest" protects the confidentiality of the data in this situation. Storage encryption may not, however, provide protection against a direct attack on a computer's access controls.

Data transmitted over a network is vulnerable to interception by unauthorized personnel. Wireless networks are particularly susceptible to unauthorized interception, and the commonly available wireless encryption solutions are not generally very secure. Encrypting data "in flight," while it is transmitted over a network, protects the confidentiality of that data.
The phrases trusted network and untrusted network appear multiple times in this document, referring to the security of the network or networks used to transmit data. Unfortunately, there is no hard line dividing trusted and untrusted, and no network is 100% secure. The determination of whether a network is trusted is dependent on the nature of the data and the transmission and should consider physical, administrative, and technical security measures that have been implemented for the networks involved in the transmission. In most cases, it is safest to assume that networks are untrusted.
It should be noted that there is another way to move data that does not involve data transmission over a network. Data can be stored on portable media, such as CD-ROMs or USB "thumb" drives, and physically transported to its destination:

In this case, storage encryption can be used to protect data while it is "resting" in a vehicle.
The following diagram shows a mix of servers, desktops, laptops, and PDAs that can communicate over the Internet. These devices are shown within the boundaries of various security domains that are separated by network firewalls:

As can be seen in this diagram:
Data stored on devices within a data center is likely protected from unauthorized access because of the physical security and physical access control provided within the data center.
Sensitive data stored within other areas of an enterprise is less likely to be appropriately secure without encryption, unless a secured room or other suitable space has been prepared with appropriate physical access controls.
Sensitive data stored outside of the enterprise is not likely to be appropriately secure without encryption.
Data exchange among devices within a secure facility like a data center is likely secure without the use of encryption, assuming the traffic never leaves the physically secure boundaries of the facility. It should be noted, however, that the security of all systems within the secure facility is crucial, as a compromised system within a physically secure facility could be subverted to intercept traffic on behalf of an intruder.
Data exchange among devices within a single enterprise network is less likely to be secure without encryption than within a secure facility. Many portions of the enterprise network are not likely to provide an appropriate level of physical security for sensitive data.

Computing devices, such as laptops, PDAs, and smart phones, as well as storage media, such as CDs, DVDs, and USB drives, all have the potential of falling into the wrong hands, particularly when they are not stored in a secure location. Even non-mobile devices, such as desktop computers, have this potential. "Whole disk" encryption solutions that encrypt entire disks or disk partitions can be used to protect information on such devices. Encryption solutions that automatically encrypt all files that match configured filters can also be appropriate to protect data in some environments.
Operational Issues
Key management for whole device encryption is usually very important. If a key is lost, it is likely that the data on the device cannot be recovered, particularly if there are no other copies of the data available. In effect, key loss is not much different from a disk head crash. Care should be taken to ensure the integrity of the key repository. This repository is restricted data in itself, so strong protections, such as encryption and access control, must be implemented. (See Section 7, Key Management)
An unencrypted backup solution may be an appropriate substitute for key management, depending on tolerance for loss between the time of the most current backup and the time a key is lost. Note, though, that unencrypted backup media can represent a vulnerability; see Section 3.4, Backup and Archiving.
An encrypted disk reduces the risk of unauthorized disclosure of data when the disk is disposed of. Nevertheless, steps must be taken for the complete removal of restricted data before disposition.
It should be noted that whole disk encryption does not generally provide security from the authorized users of an encrypted disk. Operating system access controls and other security measures will likely be required for multi-user systems. Similarly, since servers with encrypted disks will likely provide unencrypted data over the network, encryption for data transmission (see Section 4, Use of Encryption for Data Transmission) should also be considered.
Recommendations
If the data on mobile devices or media is restricted, it should be encrypted through the use of a "whole disk" encryption tool or one that can at least be configured to encrypt all restricted data. Further, any computing devices and media have the potential of being lost or stolen if sufficient physical security is not provided for them. Resource Proprietors and Custodians of restricted information should consider the following priority list when selecting candidates for storage encryption:
Campuses should implement managerial and technical infrastructures to facilitate the encryption of mobile devices and media. As of this writing, system-wide contracts are being completed with two vendors of products that address the technical infrastructure.
It is often necessary to encrypt individual files. This is usually done to facilitate secure transport of those files. As discussed in Section 4.2, File Transfers, this allows for secure transport over a network without transmission encryption. It also allows secure transport of files on off-line storage devices, such as a CD-ROMs or "thumb" drives.
Operational Issues
The keys needed to decrypt the files must be sent to the recipient via some method other than how the file is transmitted to ensure that the encrypted files and the keys cannot be intercepted together.
Recommendations
Campuses should promulgate recommended tool sets to facilitate file encryption.
Encryption of database storage is often needed for reasons similar to whole disk encryption. In fact, encryption of database storage can often be implemented through the use of a "whole disk" encryption tool, but database server software may also provide this capability. A database server-based encryption solution is generally required to selectively encrypt specific tables or columns of a database and may also be required to segregate access rights among multiple applications that utilize a single database server.
Operational Issues
Database storage encryption does not imply that data in the database will be encrypted when it is transmitted over a network. In general, data is decrypted by the database server before it is transmitted, so encryption for data transmission (see Section 4, Use of Encryption for Data Transmission) should also be considered.
An encrypted database reduces the risk of unauthorized disclosure of data when the database's disk media are disposed of. Depending on the sensitivity of the data, it may not be necessary to contract for disk destruction services.
The decision of whether to use whole disk or database server encryption is dependent on a number of factors, such as the existence of multiple applications, system administration, performance, cost, and backup requirements.
Backup and archival copies of restricted data are, themselves, restricted data. The media used for backup and archiving represent an opportunity for unauthorized access to data. Encryption can be used to protect that data.
Operational Issues
When storage encryption has been implemented, backup strategies should be reevaluated. Depending on the specific storage encryption and backup solutions used, the backups may or may not be encrypted.
More importantly, the backup media represent a copy of data that may require encryption. An assessment must be done of the need to encrypt the backup media, based on the sensitivity of the data and the physical and technical protections in place, particularly if the media are sent off-site.
If encrypted backups are created, key management becomes particularly important, especially in disaster recovery scenarios. A further issue for key management occurs when a backup must be archived for a long period of time. The archived media will be unusable if the keys are not similarly (but separately) archived.
Recommendations
Backup procedures should be assessed to ensure that backup copies of restricted data are appropriately protected, by physical and/or technical means, particularly when they are sent off-site.
Remote login sessions can represent a significant vulnerability to restricted data that is transmitted between the end-user and the server, particularly login passwords. Examples of remote login solutions include telnet, ssh, tn3270, and "remote control" software for PCs.
Recommendations
Interactive sessions that transmit restricted data should be encrypted. Note that login passwords should often be considered restricted, even when no other restricted data is transmitted.
Encryption for file transfers can be accomplished in one of two ways: 1) encryption of the transmission itself, or 2) transmission of an encrypted file.
Operational Issues
The encryption key for an encrypted file containing restricted data is also restricted data. Appropriate protections must be implemented for the encryption key.
It is not always practical to implement complete "end to end" encryption for file transfers, although this is desirable. When the two ends do not support mutually interoperable encryption solutions, files may be transferred without encryption to or from proxy systems that do support interoperable encryption and have a trusted system administration. That proxy system must be near enough to the real end-system (e.g., in the same data center) that unauthorized observation of the file is very unlikely when moved between an end-system and its proxy.
Recommendations
When encrypted files are transmitted, the keys should be transmitted via a separate, secure channel to minimize the possibility that the keys are intercepted along with the data they encrypt.
Encryption for communication of restricted data between users' browsers and web-based applications and content is provided through the use of the HTTPS protocol, which incorporates TLS/SSL.
Operational Issues
Use of HTTPS requires installation of an X.509 digital certificate for the application's server. Since these certificates expire after a specified period of time, a process must be implemented to renew expiring certificates.
If the Certificate Authority used to generate a server certificate is not configured in a user's browser, the user will receive an error message saying that the server certificate is not valid.
Typically, information that is retrieved by a web browser is stored in a "cache" file directory on the browser's computer in an unencrypted form. This cache may be available to other people who access (or compromise) that computer.
Recommendations
The X.509 certificates installed on servers should be acquired from Certificate Authorities that are included in common browser distributions.
Display of restricted data should be limited to only what is required by the application. When restricted data must be displayed, however, that data should be sent with the "Cache-Control: no-cache" HTTP header to limit caching by web browsers. Application developers should also be aware that not all browsers honor this control for all file types.
Authorized users of applications that display restricted data should be cautioned not to use web browsers that are shared with people who do not have the same level of authorization.
S/MIME is an open, standard solution that solves all of these problems by encrypting the body of the message itself, using either PKI or PGP for key management. S/MIME also enables the use of digital signatures to verify the authenticity of the sender and the message. Unfortunately, it is not widely deployed, so it is really only of general utility within a well-identified community.
Various vendors, such as PostX, Tumbleweed, Voltage, and ZixCorp, provide server-based solutions that use electronic mail simply to notify recipients when a message has been stored for them on a secure web server. This also provides security, but requires the use of a second, web-based mail system, as well as a strategy for sharing encryption keys in a secure manner.
Operational Issues
Unfortunately, none of these solutions are widely deployed. It may be necessary to implement multiple solutions for different segments of the community. The most pragmatic approach at this point in time may be to put restricted data in an encrypted file and attach the file to an otherwise unencrypted mail message. (See Section 3.2, File Encryption.) This requires a strategy for sharing encryption keys in a secure manner.
Recommendations
Campuses should promulgate recommended tools for sending encrypted data through electronic mail. This is likely to include the tool set identified under "File Encryption."
When restricted data is output to a network-attached printer, there is a vulnerability of unauthorized interception. When it is required to print restricted information, products such as JetDirect can be used to provide encryption. Alternatively, the printer can be directly attached to a server that utilizes a protocol, such as IPP, that can encrypt its network traffic.
Operational Issues
There may be a greater risk of people reading the printed material than intercepting the network traffic when the destination printer does not have sufficient access controls, either by being in a secure facility or through some authentication mechanism provided by the printer. The University has a growing number of applications that require employees to print restricted information, such as personal health care information or pay advice stubs. Resource providers should consider printer security when this is the case.
Many printers do not support encryption, and the cost and space requirements for dedicated print servers may be high. When restricted information must be printed, printers and associated encryption solutions must be selected to fit within the printing infrastructure, as well as providing encryption.
Recommendations
Resource Custodians for departmental and campus print services should assess the secure printing needs of their communities and provide solutions and education, as appropriate.
Restricted information on file servers (e.g., servers that are mounted by client workstations to provide shared file directories) is vulnerable to unauthorized interception when that information is accessed over a network.
Operational Issues
Commonly used file server protocols, such as Microsoft's CIFS, do not support encryption. The WebDAV protocol, which is supported uniformly on all popular operating systems, can often be used as an alternative to provide encryption.
Recommendations
Resource Custodians for departmental and campus file services should assess the need to protect restricted data on their servers and implement encrypted protocols (and provide user education) as appropriate.
Communication between an application server and a database server over a network is vulnerable to unauthorized interception if encryption is not employed.
Operational Issues
Encryption for communication with a database server is generally provided as part of, or an option to, the database server software.
In many common scenarios, it may not be necessary to encrypt the communication with a database server. For example, if access to a database is always through an application, and the application server is co-located with the database server in a data center, then communication between the two is unlikely to be observed by unauthorized personnel, and encryption is probably not needed. A corollary to this is that encrypting database access probably does not obviate the need for encryption in other aspects of a system. For example, it may still be important to encrypt the exchange of data between the application server and a user's web browser.
Direct communication between cooperating applications is becoming more common; Web Services rely on this capability. As always, this communication is vulnerable to unauthorized interception.
Operational Issues
Modern application-to-application communication protocols, such as SOAP, are based on web protocols. When those protocols are used to transmit restricted data, HTTPS can be used to enable encryption. Because HTTPS's encryption is based on PKI, this also can guard against spoofing attacks by authenticating the applications to each other.
Application protocols that are not web-based often have a proprietary encryption option that can be used. When this is not possible, the only alternative may be to implement a Virtual Private Network (see Section 4.9, Virtual Private Network (VPN).).
Recommendations
Use SOAP with HTTPS or some other commonly-available encrypted protocol to transmit restricted data when possible. When not possible, restricted data should be transmission by means of a Virtual Private Network.
Operational Issues
VPNs are commonly engineered to encrypt traffic between an enterprise network and locations outside of that network, so traffic is often not encrypted within the enterprise network. If all traffic to a specific server, say a file server, should be encrypted, careful engineering of the VPN will be required.
In general, all members of a VPN will have equal access to all other members. It is difficult, for example, to use a VPN to ensure that the two computers exchanging data are the only two that can decrypt the traffic, increasing the likelihood that a third, compromised computer will be able to intercept the traffic.
It is difficult to configure a device to be a member of multiple VPNs. This can complicate situations where, for example, a single PC must access multiple secure applications provided by multiple organizations.
Recommendations
VPNs should be used to protect restricted information when other alternatives are not feasible.
Campuses should assess the need for a VPN to encrypt traffic for devices in untrusted or hostile portions of the network, such as campus wireless networks or the rest of the Internet.
The science of cryptology is based on subtle mathematics; it is not uncommon for software implementers to increase risk unintentionally through poor implementation.
It is difficult to eliminate all untrusted
infrastructure. In the end, it is likely that restricted information
will need to be processed and displayed by a web browser or other
client-based software that is difficult to control.
The encryption key management plan must ensure that data can be decrypted when access to data is necessary. This requires backup or other strategies, such as key escrow, to enable decryption, thereby ensuring that data can be recovered in the event of loss or unavailability of cryptographic keys.
The encryption key management plan must address handling the compromise or suspected compromise of encryption keys. A contingency plan should address what actions should be taken in the event of a compromise, such as with system software and hardware, cryptographic keys, or encrypted data.
Encryption keys should be managed in a manner similar to passwords. For example, they should not be shared among multiple people, and they should be revoked when people leave the University.
Users must be made aware of their unique role if they
are given responsibility for maintaining control of cryptographic keys.
One-way encryption is a form of encryption that cannot be decrypted. It is typically used for passwords and other information that need only be verified, never retrieved. Note that the amount of data encrypted in this manner is often small, making this technique susceptible to brute force attacks. When the encrypted data is available to the attacker, many or all possible values can be encrypted to determine which unencrypted value generated a particular encrypted value.
Public key encryption can be used to verify the authenticity of documents or data, as well as the author or source of those documents or data. Key management is very important in this scenario, as unauthorized disclosure of a private key enables forgery that cannot be detected.
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Application Scenario |
Recommendations |
|---|---|
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All Scenarios |
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"Whole Disk" Encryption |
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File Encryption |
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Backup and Archiving |
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Interactive Sessions |
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File Transfers |
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Web-Based Applications |
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Electronic Mail |
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Network Printer Communication |
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Remote File Services |
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Application-to-Application Communication |
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) |
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Application-Level Encryption |
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Encryption Strength |
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Key Management |
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Application Scenario |
Technology Solutions |
|---|---|
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"Whole Disk" Encryption |
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File Encryption |
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Database Storage |
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Backup and Archiving |
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Interactive Sessions |
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File Transfers |
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Web-Based Applications |
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Electronic Mail |
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Network Printer Communication |
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Remote File Services |
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Database Access |
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Application-to-Application Communication |
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) |
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1The phrase restricted data is used in this document with a liberal interpretation of its definition in Business and Finance Bulletin IS-3, Electronic Information Security. In general, it is better to decide to encrypt data than to leave it unencrypted, unless the overhead of key management or the encryption itself is an overriding issue.