REPORT OF THE WASC SPECIAL VISIT TEAM

To the University of California Office of the President and Board of Regents

October 23 – October 24, 2007

Team Roster
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The evaluation team in conducting its review was able to evaluate the institution according to Commission Standards and Core Commitments and therefore submits this Report to the Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges for action and to the institution for consideration.
On October 23-24, 2007, a special committee of the Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC) visited the Office of the President of the University of California (UC) in Oakland. This report provides background information, findings, and recommendations for the UC Board of Regents, for UC’s senior executives, and for WASC.

The names and affiliations of the members of the special committee are listed in Appendix A. The special committee expresses its gratitude for the candor and responsiveness of all with whom it met while in Oakland, and also of those who provided information in individual interviews and in conference calls. We are especially grateful to President Robert Dynes, Provost and Executive Vice President Wyatt R. Hume, and staff members in the President’s Office for their responsiveness to our many questions; to the Regents who provided context and their perspectives on the issues that we were asked to examine; and to the faculty members, chancellors, former chancellors, and others who provided us with valuable information and commentary.

Hilary A. Baxter, UC’s WASC Accreditation Liaison Officer, and Diane M. Griffiths, the Regents’ Secretary and Chief of Staff, provided specific and timely assistance, for which we are grateful. Several Regents met with us face-to-face or by telephone. These included Chair Richard C. Blum, Vice-Chair Russell Gould, Judith Hopkinson, Joanne Kozburg, and Sherry L. Lansing. WASC President and Executive Director Ralph A. Wolff advised us before, during, and after the
visit. Each has contributed in some sense to this report, and we are grateful to all.

In addition, Cameron Howell of the President’s Office at the University of Virginia provided invaluable staff support throughout this project, including serving as principal drafter of this report. We are much indebted to him.

Background

In 1992, following controversy about executive compensation, the UC Regents adopted policies and procedures to promote fiscal transparency and to prevent abuse. These policies appear not to have been adjusted after 1992. Over time, UC administrators and Regents apparently forgot these policies or ceased to follow them systematically. In November of 2005, the San Francisco Chronicle, and subsequently other news sources, alleged large-scale irregularities in the salaries and compensation awarded to high-level UC administrators.

State government and the UC appear to have initiated inquiries shortly after the newspaper reports appeared, among them a Task Force (and eventual report) on UC Compensation, Accountability, and Transparency; two external audits conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers; one internal audit conducted by the University Auditor; and a state audit conducted by California’s Bureau of State Audits.

These reports and audits revealed numerous failures and violations of UC policies. The Regents’ 1992 policy required that all compensation arrangements (including base salary, moving expenses, special relocation allowances, housing...
allowances, and summer stipends) for some 300 senior executives be identified and presented to the Regents in their action agenda when the Regents approved these appointments. In scores of instances over at least the past half-dozen years, total compensation was not systematically included in approval requests made to the Regents.

WASC Accountability Issues

In light of the audit findings, WASC examined UC’s compliance with its standards and criteria for accreditation. The identified irregular compensation arrangements included, among others, administrators on UC’s separately accredited campuses. WASC President and Executive Director Ralph A. Wolff wrote to President Dynes on December 7, 2006, that each UC campus is affected by governance actions taken by the UC Office of the President and the Regents; system-level governance and deficiencies in system-level governance “have direct impact on and relevance to the accreditation of each campus.” Mr. Wolff identified as relevant two specific WASC Standards for Accreditation:

The matters identified in the audits are subject to Commission attention under Standard 1, which covers institutional integrity and accountability[,] and Standard 3, which covers financial controls and oversight and decision-making processes. In addition, these issues have implications under Standards 1 and 3 with regard to University governance—how the governance systems of the
University are responding to assure that these matters are being addressed in a timely and appropriate way.

In addition, five of WASC’s Criteria for Review were determined to be at issue. CFRs 1.3, 1.8, 3.8, 3.9., and 3.10 read as follows:

CFR 1.3 The institution’s leadership creates and sustains a leadership system at all levels that is marked by high performance, appropriate responsibility, and accountability.

CFR 1.8 The institution exhibits integrity in its operations as demonstrated by the implementation of appropriate policies, sound business practices, timely and fair responses to complaints and grievances, and regular evaluation of its performance in these areas.

CFR 3.8 The institution’s organizational structures and decision-making processes are clear, consistent with its purposes, and sufficient to support effective decision making.

CFR 3.9 The institution has an independent governing board or similar authority that, consistent with its legal and fiduciary authority, exercises appropriate oversight over institutional integrity, policies, and ongoing operations, including hiring and evaluating the chief executive officer.

CFR 3.10 The institution has a chief executive whose full-time responsibility is to the institution, together with a cadre of
administrators qualified and able to provide effective educational leadership and management at all levels.

In May of 2007, Mr. Wolff appointed the current special committee (1) to determine whether or not the University of California (at the levels of the Regents, Office of the President [UCOP], and campuses) has responded effectively to issues arising under WASC Standards 1 and 3 and the five related CFRs; (2) to evaluate how these responses illuminate the governance functions of the UCOP, the Regents, and the campuses; (3) to offer advice to benefit the UC system; (4) to identify necessary follow-up actions to be taken by the UC and/or WASC with respect to the audit findings and CFRs; and (5) to offer advice to strengthen and clarify the relationship between the University of California system and WASC.

The University’s Response

On September 17, 2007, UC submitted to WASC and to the special committee the report entitled “Follow-up Action in Response to Task Force Report and Audits on Compensation” and supported by appendices labeled A through Z. This report summarizes the UC compensation issues and identifies conditions that contributed to them, describes the relationship between WASC standards and the compensation controversy, and outlines corrective actions taken by the University.

The report discloses that UC has implemented numerous remedies in response to the audit findings. Some of these remedies are ongoing or have not
yet begun. These include Regents’ actions, system-level reforms, and campus-level reforms.

Committee Procedure

The WASC special committee evaluated the UC’s “Follow-up Action in Response to Task Force Report and Audits on Compensation” and discussed this report in a conference call before visiting the UC System Office on October 23-24. Members of the special committee spoke with Richard C. Blum, Chair of the Board of Regents, in a conference call on October 1. (Mr. Blum could not be present during the October 23-24 visit.) Using a uniform set of questions, committee members interviewed several current and former UC chancellors, as well as a former UC provost. With two exceptions, these interviews were conducted before the special committee’s October 23-24 special visit. Telephone conversations with one Regent who could not be present during the special visit occurred after the visit. While in Oakland, the committee had access to additional documents and reports relevant to the compensation audits and to UC’s systems of governance.

Committee Findings

On page 2 of UC’s “Follow-up Action in Response to Task Force Report and Audits on Compensation” document, the University makes the following assertion. Underlining for emphasis is original to the report:
We believe that, collectively, corrective measures taken by the University—those completed, those underway[,] and those requiring additional attention—yield policies and practices at all levels that are wholly consistent with the standards upon which WASC accreditation is based.

Although the WASC special committee concurs that the several audits have led to a conscientious and through analysis of many of the issues relating to violations of compensation policies, the committee’s interviews and research also led the committee to the conclusion that there are significant, other governance issues that the UC needs to address, some of which are matters of serious concern.

The issues leading to the creation of the special committee appear to have occurred primarily at the interface between the UC Office of the President and the Regents. We neither heard nor found in the audit reports any suggestion of impropriety or irregularity on any of the campuses. UC’s “Follow-up Action in Response to Task Force Report and Audits on Compensation” proposes vesting significant new responsibilities in the Office of the President. Separately, however, Chairman Blum’s August 22, 2007, letter (“We Need to Be Strategically Dynamic”) challenges the functioning of the Office of the President and calls for reorganization and changes in the operation of the President’s Office.

We heard from virtually all with whom we talked that governing the UC system and its ten campuses should be the collaborative work of the campus chancellors and administration, the President or Office of the President, and the
Regents. In reviewing the overall assignment and delegation of roles and responsibilities between the campuses, the Office of the President, and the Regents, we found deviations from WASC’s standards or expectations of “leadership,” by which term the Standards and CFRs clearly include both administrators and the Regents. We spoke to no one who disagreed with this observation. The University identified some of these deviations in its reports, and it has developed processes to correct many of them. Related audits are still in progress. In addition, the Regents have relied heavily on external consultants, notably PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Mercer Group, to propose new systems and procedures.

We believe that these efforts are likely to document adequately the deviations from policy that did occur with respect to compensation issues and to make future violations unlikely. One caution deserves to be noted: A challenge that arises when correcting past wrongs and, at the same time, revising necessarily complex policies for the future is to avoid over-correction. A flawless reporting system may trigger expansion of processes that are already highly bureaucratic and, in the process, make timely action on high-level appointments more complicated than necessary.

From the information available, we see no reason to believe that the deviations from the Regents’ 1992 policy were intentional or that anyone in the Office of the President deliberately departed from the Regents’ requirements and expectations. In many instances, the total compensation of proposed appointees appears actually to have been reported to the Regents, but in background
documents rather than in the Regents’ action agenda. (The 1992 policy required that this information appear in the action agenda.) In most identified instances of incomplete or improper reporting of total compensation, the unreported amounts were comparable to compensation approved for persons in comparable positions whose compensation was reported properly in the action agenda.

The available information suggests that personnel in the Office of the President decided on a case-by-case basis which elements of compensation to report in the action agenda and which not to report.

These facts being as they are, we believe that the deviations from the Regents’ 1992 compensation policy were not in compliance with WASC standards as noted below and resulted from the following:

(1) Loss of “institutional memory,” including knowledge that the 1992 policies ever existed. Few or no Regents or senior UC officers were in their current positions when the 1992 policies were adopted (WASC Standards 1 and 3; CFRs 1.3, 1.8, 3.8, and 3.9).

(2) An internal audit system that failed to track compliance with Regents’ policies and flag them for the Regents or for the President. This issue touches both governance and executive management practices (WASC Standards 1 and 3; CFRs 1.3, 1.8, and 3.9).

(3) The absence of systematic review of materials submitted to the Regents by persons charged specifically with verifying the
action agenda’s adherence to established policies. This or analogous safeguards ought to be commonplace protections for a public board with responsibilities as broad as the Regents’ responsibilities (WASC Standard 3; CFRs 1.3 and 3.8).

(4) The absence of a central or universally accessible system for personnel records, including compensation records. The various campuses have independent human resource databases. No universal interface exists. Needed compensation data are acquired from the campuses manually and slowly—a problem that appears to account for the delay of four months before the University could respond to the executive compensation allegations originally made in the Chronicle in 2005 (CFR 3.7 [“information technology resources. . . sufficiently coordinated and supported to fulfill (the University’s) educational purposes and to provide key academic and administrative functions”]).

More than one factor seems to have shaped an environment in which violations of UC compensation policies were not uncommon. One is the Regent’s decision several years ago, as reported by several Board members, to decentralize the University’s administration. Senior officers were instructed to “bring less material to the Board” for review and approval, but the instruction came in the form of informal direction rather than in the form of a policy revision. The Regents’ need to keep their workload under control is
understandable and legitimate. At the same time, senior officers working under these informal instructions were placed at risk with regard to Regents’ policies adopted prior to their time.

A second factor is clearly the scale and complexity of the Regents’ workload and the quality of the management systems available to the President’s staff as they provide services to the Regents. The absence of a centrally accessible personnel system makes compensation work especially difficult. Generally speaking, meetings occur every second month, a schedule that is in no sense unusual for boards of this kind. Offers of employment and salary commitments often need to occur between Board meetings. Chancellors and other officers hire new colleagues in a competitive marketplace where timely offers have a premium value and where an unwieldy, prolonged, and bureaucratic process of approval can damage the University’s interests.

Additional Issues of Significance

Although the special committee initially focused on the response of the UCOP and Regents to compensation issues, it soon became clear that other significant issues were also present in the UC’s governance, leadership, and decision-making processes that are relevant to WASC’s standards. As a result, the special committee is obligated to report what it found in the course of examining UC’s written submissions to WASC and in the course of its interviews and research. We believe that some of these issues are not widely recognized by the Board of Regents but are of sufficient significance to warrant attention,
reflection, and action. At the present time, these issues seem fundamental to effective governance and decision-making, especially at a time when the University’s leadership is in transition:

1. There is no consistent, verifiable annual evaluation of the President conducted in the context of annual or other presidential plans of work agreed upon by the President and the Board of Regents. We heard contradictory reports about evaluations of the President. These ranged from no evaluation, to evaluation by a few Regents, to evaluation by the Chair, all described as both with and without periodic reports of findings to the Regents (WASC Standard 1; CFRs 1.3, 1.8, and 3.9).

2. There is no consistent, systematic board self-assessment, and there is no on-going or constant improvement/self-improvement program for the Regents. Newly appointed Regents receive a general briefing on UC systems and procedures shortly after they are appointed. Regents and staff members told us that, after this initial orientation session, the Regents do not engage in process- or system-improvement exercises to assure that they understand current best practices among boards with similar mandates. Responses to our questions about Regents’ participation in the on-going training programs offered for college and university board members by the Association of Governing Boards and similar organizations were mixed. No one with whom we talked reported having taken part in any training exercise of this kind (WASC Standard 1 and Standard 3; CFRs 1.3, 1.8, and 3.9).
Symptomatic of the Board’s failure to address “best-practice” governance issues, we received differing responses when we asked whether or not the Regents had discussed among themselves the possible value of Sarbanes-Oxley principles of corporate governance to their work as Regents, particularly with regard to their fiduciary responsibilities. One prominent Regent said that they had not. Others said that they had. Similarly, no Regent with whom we spoke was familiar with the two commissions formed by the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) specifically to recommend best practices for board governance as it relates to the employment and assessment of college and university presidents. (See the 1996 report of the AGB Commission on the Academic Presidency [“Stronger Leadership for Troubled Times”] and the 2006 report of the AGB Task Force on the State of the Presidency in American Higher Education [“The Leadership Imperative”].) In our opinion, knowledge of these two reports might well have protected the Regents’ interests in executive compensation and general oversight of the Office of the President.

3. There are no consistent (formal or informal) “operating procedures” for Chair and Regent conduct and decision-making. There appears to be a practice among members of the UC Board of Regents, especially the Chair, to make seemingly official statements regarding the UC without formal Board action or prior discussion and authorization of the Board through collective action. It is a general principle of board functioning that boards act only through formal and collective action, rather than as individuals. One example of individual rather than collective action arose in the discussion of widely publicized plans issued in
a position paper by Chairman Blum on the need for reorganization of the UC Office of the President. We received inconsistent responses when we asked to what extent the entire Board of Regents or some significant Regents’ committee had contributed to or approved Chairman Blum’s letter (“We Need to Be Strategically Dynamic”) before that letter was published and circulated, and, in response, the administrative reorganization described in it was begun by the University administration. Generally speaking, the Regents with whom we talked said that they had little or no knowledge of the letter prior to receiving it and reading newspaper accounts of it. It is clear that the letter and proposed actions were not formally adopted by the Board prior to publication (WASC Standard 1 and Standard 3; CFRs 1.3, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.11).

Responses were similarly inconsistent when we asked whether or not the Regents had discussed or approved the letter at their next meeting, following the letter’s publication. A faculty spokesperson told us that he discussed it in his presentation to the Regents at this meeting. We heard also that one other reference to it occurred during this meeting, but that the Regents did not discuss the letter or approve the then-in-progress reorganization of the President’s Office and appointment of a Chief Operating Officer. The special committee finds it highly unusual and at odds with accepted board governance “best practice” for a letter of this importance to be made public without considerable discussion of its underlying content by the Board and the UCOP and for follow-up action to be taken in response to the call of a single Regent, albeit the Chair.
Similarly, the team learned that Board members have regularly and publicly commented on UC issues outside of Board meetings, sometimes critically, asserting their leadership positions on the Board. It will be important for the Board to establish clear principles defining to whom and under what circumstances individual Board members are authorized to speak on behalf of the Board, especially absent formal Board action. In addition, as further described below, formal lines of authority and boundaries between the policy-setting role of the Board and the executive function of the Office of the President need to be established and followed.

4. There is a culture of interaction within the Board of Regents that needs attention. A concern raised often enough in our interviews to merit mention is the belief that the Regents are sometimes unnecessarily harsh in their treatment of UC administrators, faculty, and staff. According to these reports, civility in communications at public and private meetings, in the media, and in other venues have suffered over time, and the consequence is a perceived absence of common purpose and a “we-they” mentality. This perception merits attention because it undermines shared governance and collective responsibility (WASC Standard 1 and Standard 3; CFRs 1.3, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10).

Committee Recommendations

The following recommendations are made in the spirit of encouraging further progress on the issues facing the University of California:
1. UC should build comprehensive processes and procedures to assure that policies adopted at any level within the organization are preserved and understood by persons responsible to implement them. These policies and procedures should be readily available internally and to the public. Available technology will allow this information to be maintained within a searchable, public database with appropriate indexing and editorial attention to assure that interested persons generally (not to mention persons who need to know because of their duties) can find and track policies relevant to any issue. We recommend further that the Regents adopt a system-wide rule of sunsetting and then periodically reenacting policies so that chancellors, the President, and the Regents do not find themselves locked into policies (or salary caps or any other artificially rigid prescriptions) that by their nature require regular review and renewal.

2. The Regents should continue building the effectiveness of their operations by such means as the Governance Committee already created as a response to the compensation crisis, a strong and properly staffed Audit Committee supported by state-of-the-art financial accounting and control systems throughout the UC, and a coherent system for verifying regulatory compliance. Among other responsibilities, the Governance Committee might well design and run that part of the orientation of new Regents to the Regents’ responsibilities, codes of conduct (including agreements as to who speaks for the Regents and what responsibilities come to individual Regents when they speak for, or present themselves as speaking for, the UC), customs of operation, and range of authorities. This committee might also take responsibility for periodically sending individual Regents to meetings
of the Association of Governing Boards, WASC, and the American Council of Education, and it might encourage Regents to volunteer to serve on visiting committees of WASC and other accrediting and regulatory entities that address issues like the UC’s, but in other states and contexts. It might also manage a new set of programs of self-assessment, self-scrutiny, and self-improvement for the Regents. The Audit Committee or some other designated committee should regularly conduct self-assessment programs for the Regents. These should include assessments of members’ individual work, of the work done by committees of the Regents, and of the performance of the President and the Office of the President.

The Regents’ Audit Committee should assume at least some of the responsibilities accepted by the audit committees of the boards of public companies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, even though these responsibilities are not imposed by law on not-for-profit entities. Best practice is a common matter of scrutiny for well-governed boards and universities. An audit committee is a natural repository for this responsibility. Among other responsibilities, the Regents’ system for verifying regulatory compliance should provide regular reports for the Regents on the UC’s accreditation, federal statutory, state statutory, and other regulatory obligations, and also on processes of regulatory change that affect or may plausibly affect the UC. Here, too, the Regents’ goal ought to be informed by best practice.
3. The Regents and the UCOP should develop procedures that allow for timely appointments of senior officers consistent with the competitive marketplace for institutions of UC’s quality.

4. As they seek a new President, the Regents should devote significant time and thought to developing a document that clearly defines the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of the President – along with the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of the Board of Regents. Ambiguity about the respective roles of the Regents and the President compounds the problems described in this report. Mr. Blum’s letter (“We Need to Be Strategically Dynamic”) may solve certain problems and meet genuine needs, including the need for institutional memory of Regents’ policies, but unresolved ambiguity about which functions belong to the Regents and their new Chief of Staff and which belong to the President will likely complicate rather than simplify roles and responsibilities as a new UC President takes office. A document defining the roles of the President and Board might take the form of a compact or codicil or side letter to the letter of the President’s appointment, and in this compact the Regents and the eventual President should subscribe together to a set of core principles for the future. These should include transparency, strict attention to policies competently adopted and to perpetual review and renewal of these policies, and understandings about who speaks for the UC and with what authority. This compact should define the limits of each signatory’s responsibilities and authorities. It should embody sound principles of institutional governance and execution of positions of public trust. It should be a public document, and it should be periodically updated.
5. The Office of the President should develop protocols to support the campuses and especially campus leaders in a timely manner during periods of turmoil, and indeed should seek closer alignment with the chancellors on all matters of common concern. It should advocate, build, and maintain effective central systems for common functions, including personnel management and finance. The UCOP must be accountable to the Regents for the integrity and effectiveness of its operations while serving the needs of the chancellors and their campuses. Sound management and control systems are central to the task of serving both constituencies in a manner that addresses issues in a transparent and expeditious manner. In building these systems, the UC Office of the President must have the support of the chancellors and the Regents.

6. For WASC: Revise the accreditation criteria to include explicit standards for system presidencies and system boards. These are implicit in the current criteria, but lay persons appointed to such boards as the UC Board of Regents might well not understand such terms as “leadership” in a context more complex than that of an individual campus.

Conclusions

UC’s individual campuses are among the best and most respected in the nation and in the world. The system as a whole sets a standard of excellence. This standard of excellence deserves to be matched by an equal level of excellence in the University of California’s governance systems, in both the Board of Regents and the Office of the President. The WASC special committee
believes that the University urgently needs to upgrade and to modernize its governance systems and procedures. Although real and significant progress has been made in regard to UC’s compensation policies and practices, serious issues remain to be addressed with respect to the general systems of governance, leadership, and decision-making that are required by WASC’s Standards and Criteria for Review.

The process of searching for a new President of the University of California presents a unique opportunity to define more clearly the roles and responsibilities of each of the key parties in the UC’s governance and leadership. Moreover, given all of the challenges of the past several years in addressing the policy violations that have occurred in relation to UC compensation, in addressing media claims regarding these violations, and in addressing criticism levied by members of the UC Board against its own administration, there is a need to reestablish confidence in the senior administration of the University and a need for the Board to conduct itself in ways that will ensure the success of any new President (and of the Office of the President). Failure to address these issues could, over time, threaten the reputation that the University of California has deservedly earned as perhaps the nation’s finest system of public higher education.
APPENDIX A: TEAM ROSTER

Western Association of Schools and Colleges
Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities

TEAM ROSTER AND TITLE PAGE
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Date of Visit: October 23-25, 2007
Type of Visit: Special

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APPENDIX B: SCHEDULE FOR SPECIAL VISIT BY THE WESTERN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Tuesday, October 23

Claremont Hotel
41 Tunnel Road
Berkeley, CA 94705
(510) 843-3000

3:00 – 5:00 p.m. – Team meeting (Lanai I)

5:00 – 6:00 p.m. – President Robert Dynes (Lanai I)

6:30 – 8:30 p.m. – Private dinner (Monterey Room on the mezzanine level)
   ~ Wyatt (Rory) Hume, Provost and Executive Vice President
   ~ Katherine Lapp, Executive Vice President, Business Operations

Wednesday, October 24

UC Office of the President
1111 Franklin Street
Oakland, CA 94607
(510) 987-9418

8:00 – 10:00 a.m. – Meeting with UCOP staff that oversee or work on compensation
   (rm. 9115)
   ~ Katherine Lapp, Executive Vice President, Business Operations
   ~ Nicholas Jewell, Vice Provost, Academic Personnel
   ~ Judy Boyette, Associate Vice President, Human Resources & Benefits
   ~ Dennis Larsen, Executive Director, Resource Administration, Human Resources & Benefits

10:00 – 10:15 a.m. – Break

10:15 – 11:15 a.m. – General Counsel Charles Robinson (rm. 9115)

11:15 – 12:15 p.m. – Universitywide Academic Senate (rm. 9115)
   ~ Michael Brown, Chair
   ~ Mary Croughan, Vice Chair
12:30 – 2:30 p.m. – **Lunch** (rm. 12107)
   ~ Regent Russ Gould, Vice Chair
   ~ Regent Judith Hopkinson, former Compensation Committee Chair
   ~ Regent Joanne Kozberg, co-chair of Compensation Task Force

2:30 – 3:00 p.m. – Follow-up as needed for clarification, review of documents, and additional information (rm. 9115)

3:00 – 4:30 p.m. – Team meeting (rm. 9115)

4:30 – 5:30 p.m. – Provost Hume (rm. 12102)

5:30 – 6:30 p.m. – President Dynes (President’s conference room – 12th floor)

Arrangements have been made for the team to have dinner at the Claremont on Thursday, October 24, at 7:30. In addition, the Lanai I room will be available for the team members’ use from the initial team meeting through 11:00 p.m. on the 24th. The room will be equipped with Wi-Fi internet access, a printer, two copies of the complete report (including appendices), and other supplies listed in the WASC visit guide.